Blended Memory: the Changing Balance of Technologically-mediated Semantic and Episodic Memory by Fawns, Tim
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Blended Memory: the Changing Balance of Technologically-
mediated Semantic and Episodic Memory
Citation for published version:
Fawns, T 2012, Blended Memory: the Changing Balance of Technologically-mediated Semantic and
Episodic Memory. in P Wilson & P McEntaggart (eds), Navigating Landscapes of Mediated Memory. The
Inter-Disciplinary Press, pp. 121-131.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Navigating Landscapes of Mediated Memory
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Fawns, T. (2012). Blended Memory: the Changing Balance of Technologically-mediated Semantic and
Episodic Memory. In P. Wilson, & P. McEntaggart (Eds.), Navigating Landscapes of Mediated Memory. (pp. 121-
131). The Inter-Disciplinary Press.
https://www.interdisciplinarypress.net/online-store/ebooks/digital-humanities/navigating-landscapes-of-mediated-
memory
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
Blended Memory: The Changing Balance of Technologically-
Mediated Semantic and Episodic Memory 
 
Tim Fawns 
 
Abstract 
Ubiquitous technologies are leading us to be less selective when encoding, 
reviewing, and sharing details of the events in our lives. Reviewing digital photos 
has been shown to help the reinforcement of autobiographical memory. However, 
we need to know more about the type of memory experience these practices lead 
to. Accessing too much recorded detail about past events could lead our minds to 
engage less fully in the construction of memory, avoiding episodic experience by 
short-cutting to semantic knowledge. External memory has always been crucial to 
our memory process and our growing digital memories bring with them great 
potential advantages. Technology should, however, be designed to complement our 
minds rather than to replace them. Increased distance from our own experience 
through a failure to invoke episodic memory may lead to detachment from our own 
memories and, consequently, from our sense of self and from others. This paper 
introduces the term ‘blended memory’ to conceptualise the balance of internal 
(biological) and external (physical, digital or communal) memory, then speculates 
on how changes to this balance might impact on the way we view our past, present 
and future. 
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1.  Introduction  
 Digital technology is changing the way we capture, store, organise, review and 
share details of the events in our lives. Digital cameras, for example, allow us to 
take hundreds, or even thousands, of photos at minimal cost. They allow us to 
review photos immediately and retake imperfect ones. We are printing fewer 
photos, viewing them instead on computer screens, mobile phones and other 
devices. Websites such as Flickr and Facebook allow us to instantly send our 
photos to large groups of people. Add to this the ease of recording video and the 
rate at which personal information is expanding in our email accounts, social-
networking sites and mobile devices and a picture begins to form of a social 
memory similar to what Jung called our ‘collective unconscious.’1 
 Our growing digital memory stores bring with them great potential advantages.  
We can bridge the gap between remote family members and friends by showing 
them the changes in us, our children and our surroundings. We can access details 
about our lives that would have been lost in the pre-digital age. We can access 
large banks of global knowledge. Alongside these benefits, however, is a concern 
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that we are becoming less selective about capturing, storing or sharing information. 
In the case of photos, where we used to shoot 24 or 36 photos before taking the roll 
to the chemist for development, we can now shoot hundreds of photos before 
further action is required. We sometimes take multiple shots of the same thing in 
an attempt to get the photo just right. We are also being less effortful in our 
organisation, review and sharing practices.2 Instead of organising printed photos 
into physical albums, we are more likely to copy digital photos to a computer, 
perhaps without even looking at them, particularly if there are more than seems 
manageable.3 Sharing memory artefacts (such as photos or videos) via the Internet 
or email reduces our engagement in the co-construction of memory narratives 
compared to when we talked through our photos or home videos face-to-face.4  
 All of this points to a reduction in selectivity, effort and engagement when 
encoding and consolidating memory. This paper argues that, through a lack of 
criticality in our use of digital technologies, we may be reducing the depth of our 
engagement with memory practices while retaining too much detail about our lives 
that would otherwise be forgotten. There are two important consequences of this. 
Firstly, we are spreading ourselves too thinly across too many cues to our memory, 
thereby changing the balance of memory away from rich experience and toward 
surface knowledge of ourselves. Secondly, it may be more difficult to effectively 
develop our identity if we are less selective about what we choose to assimilate and 
what we discard. The following section discusses the relationship between memory 
and identity, highlighting the importance of selectivity in the construction of our 
sense of self. 
 
2.  Episodic vs Semantic Memory and Connection to the Self 
 In 1972, Endel Tulving characterised two distinct systems relating to 
declarative memory (i.e. facts and experiences).5 Episodic memory, characterised 
by the subjective re-experience of an event, includes an awareness of the sense that 
it is you remembering your personal experience (or autonoetic awareness), as well 
as a sense of the time and space in which the event originally happened.6 To 
achieve this, one must be autonoetically aware at both the time of encoding and 
retrieval. This awareness depends on autonoetic consciousness: the capacity for 
self-awareness and the feeling of being present within the moment as an entity 
separate from the environment.7 This is different from semantic memory of your 
experience where you know what happened but you do not feel personally 
connected to it.8 To illustrate this difference, picturing (mentally re-experiencing) a 
visit to a restaurant in Paris would require accessing episodic memory, whereas 
thinking of the name of the street it was on might only require semantic memory. 
 Semantic memory is often used to approximate episodic memory.9 For 
example, it is possible to construct episodic-like narratives using personalised 
semantic information. Such narratives may give the impression that the narrator 
can remember the experience even if he or she is simply accessing knowledge of 
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what happened. If we have enough semantic details on hand to solve a problem, we 
may choose to avoid the extra effort of re-experiencing a memory.10 In this way, 
semantic memory can act as a heuristic device for episodic memory content, 
increasing efficiency but decreasing emotional connection.11 For example, if we 
see a lion, we know that it is dangerous before remembering the events that led us 
to this knowledge, allowing us react quickly to the situation. The activation of this 
semantic memory may cue a subsequent episodic memory with an associated 
emotional response but, without such re-living of the moment, the connection to 
our past experience is reduced. 
 To illustrate this point, we can look at patients with frontal lobe damage which 
is believed to be associated with impairments in autonoetic consciousness and 
episodic memory.12 There is often a subsequent lack of self-reflection and, in some 
cases, despite awareness of their cognitive deficits, a lack of concern at their 
condition which is consistent with the inability to connect semantic knowledge 
(that they have a cognitive impairment) to their own, personal situation.13 People 
with Autism Spectrum Disorder14 or Alzheimer’s Disease (see Addis et al.15) are 
also thought to have impaired capacity for episodic recall, leading to problems in 
social interaction and ability to anticipate future possibilities. In the same way, 
increased distance from our own experience through a failure to invoke episodic 
memory may lead to detachment from our own memories and, consequently, from 
our sense of self and from others. The following sections discuss the integration of 
internal memory with external memory and reflects on how shifting more details 
about our personal experiences out of our brains and into the world may lead to 
shallower processing of less personalised knowledge of ourselves. 
 
3. Blended Memory 
 The term ‘blended memory’ is used here to conceptualise the balance of 
internal (biological) and external (physical, digital or communal) memory. 
External memory has always been crucial to our memory process. We have 
distributed our knowledge of ourselves and the world for centuries by speaking to 
other people or writing our thoughts on paper. Our capacities as humans acting in 
the world are dependent on our ability to manipulate our environment via tools and 
technologies. As Marshall McLuhan wrote, ‘The wheel is an extension of the foot, 
the book is an extension of the eye; clothing, an extension of the skin, electric 
circuitry, an extension of the central nervous system.’16 Our computers, cameras, 
phones, pens and paper are extensions of our person and digital memory is a 
legitimate part of our overall memory system. Blended memory is a natural 
progression from our inherent tendency to enter into what Clark calls ‘deep and 
complex relationships with nonbiological constructs, props and aids.’17 
 Distributing aspects of our cognition to external artefacts frees up some of our 
cognitive load and allows us to engage in abstract thinking that would otherwise be 
impossible.18 It also allows us access to a rapidly expanding collective memory 
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which few would deny is an immensely valuable resource. In terms of memory, 
reviewing digital photos have been found to help reinforcement19 and innovative 
recording technologies such as Sensecam (a wearable camera that automatically 
photographs daily movements) have been shown to help people with memory 
impairments.20 However, the robust nature of digital memory brings with it a 
seemingly paradoxical potential for new types of memory bias which will be 
explored in the following sections. 
 
4. Forgetting 
 Technology should be designed to complement our minds rather than to replace 
them. Key here is the constructive, rather than reproductive, nature of our 
memories.21 Conway argues that to maintain a coherent sense of self, we need to 
align our past and our present identities by continuously reconstructing our 
memories.22 As Loftus and Calvin write, ‘The serious difference between 
computer and human memory is that we don't pop out a pristine copy of the 
original event  … We guess.’23 Constructing our memories to suit our identity and 
view of the world allows us to forget those experiences that hinder our evolution as 
people. Having overly detailed records of our experience will change the way in 
which we are able to do this because our degrees of freedom will be reduced by 
having too many digital ‘anchor points.’ When Mayer-Schonberger wrote ‘through 
perfect memory we may lose a fundamental human capacity - to live and act firmly 
in the present,’ he described the potential for us to get stuck in redundant patterns 
of thinking due to exposure to evidence that we did, said or experienced something 
that would more usefully be forgotten.24 
 
5. Distortion 
 Digital memory can seem incontrovertible. It is often perceived as more 
reliable than biological memory. A digital photo, for example, will look exactly the 
same in thirty years time as it does now. Because of this resilience, we may 
become reliant on digital memories to verify our biological ones in the same way 
that people have become reliant on calculators and spell-checkers.25 Rather than 
focusing on any impending degradation of factual or episodic recall, however, this 
paper is concerned with a possible disruption of the constructive process when 
combining biological, episodic memory with an excess of digital cues. 
 If we rely too heavily on digital artefacts, we will constrain our recollection 
largely to information that is stored in the system. We may add meta-data, such as 
tags or comments, to digital artefacts to help retain some of the context of an event 
but we will not be able to artificially retrieve associated memories or associated 
emotional information. These must be accessed via an episodic connection by 
reconstructing some part of the original experience. Instead, levelling and 
sharpening may occur where memories are distorted by certain details becoming 
exaggerated as other details fade.26 Although digital photos or videos have been 
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shown to aid recall of episodic memory,27 they may distort the salience of 
particular aspects of an experience. This happens because only certain elements of 
the event are captured by our device, leaving out many elements which were 
picked up by our senses at the time. For example, reviewing photos of a dinner 
party may artificially increase the importance of the details that were in the camera 
frame at the time the button was pressed, potentially at the expense of those 
elements that were most important to us during the night. Additional issues arise if 
the angle of the camera was not the natural angle of our experience at the time or if 
people posed for the photo, thereby creating postures and expressions which do not 
reflect the norm during the event. 
 
6.  Detachment 
 Whilst blended memory brings with it many positive aspects (described 
previously), new practices of memory sharing are blurring the boundaries between 
individual and communal memory as we extract information from a variety of 
familiar or unknown sources. Unrestrained sharing of our personal memory 
artefacts (e.g., by making them publicly-accessible), could lead to detachment from 
our memories by reducing our ownership of them. Such detachment is illustrated 
by a quote from a featured student in Class Pictures, a book of portraits of US high 
school students: ‘[looking at my picture] feels strange because I am trying to 
extract a private memory from an image that is now public.’28 
 
7.  Balancing Blended Memory  
We cannot be sure that the concerns outlined above are justified. Despite our 
long history of externalising memory, changes to these practices have always 
brought concerns. The advent of writing, argued Plato’s character Socrates in the 
Phaedrus (274-7), weakened the mind by leading people to rely on external 
artefacts rather than maintaining internal thought.29 Similarly, the printing press, 
according to scientist Conrad Gessner, heralded ‘an unmanageable flood of 
information.’30 While these technologies radically changed our memory practices, 
it would be difficult to argue that they decreased our quality of life. The same may 
be true of our expanding blended memories. 
There are certainly convincing arguments that our lives will be enhanced by 
increased access to digital memory cues. There is, however, very limited research 
into the types of memory these innovations are supporting. There is a risk that what 
we are really doing with our abundance of memory cues is reinforcing semantic 
memory but impairing episodic memory. For example, Pauly-Takacs et al. claim 
that Sensecam helped a 13-year-old boy with profound memory impairment to 
support the formation of personal semantic memory but not episodic memory.31 
While digitally-retrieved media make it easier to cue certain associated memories, 
we need to explore the richness of this experience compared to when we expend 
greater effort in remembering.  
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To avoid the problems described in this paper, we may need to be more 
selective and considered in our use of memory artefacts. Overexposure to digital 
memories without meaningful interaction threatens to devalue the artefacts we use 
to connect to our experience. This can be seen by the lower value attributed to 
digital photographs than printed photographs due to factors such as comparative 
rarity and tangibility.32 Nunes et al found that people prefer to show printed rather 
than digital photos to others and also prefer to display printed photos around their 
home or office.33 In recent times, the effort people have spent on arranging printed 
photos into physical albums, sitting in social spaces and comparing their related 
memory narratives has been an important part of the consolidation of personalised 
memory.34 Perhaps we need to rediscover the value of our memory artefacts by 
being more selective about what we capture, store and share. This would increase 
our freedom to engage more fully in our selected artefacts, organising them, 
reflecting on their meaning and constructing narratives around them with friends 
and family. 
 
8.  Conclusion 
Technology should be designed and used in a considered way that increases the 
value of our interaction with it, not just the quantity of its output. Digital memory 
stores, although bringing many significant advantages, demand effort, selectivity 
and engagement with their contents if they are to support strong connections to our 
sense of personal experience and identity. This is true for all stages of our memory 
process, including capture, storage, organisation, review and sharing. It is 
important that we explore the ways in which we can use digital artefacts to connect 
us more meaningfully to our episodic memory rather than to the semantic details of 
our lives. Those practices and technologies that currently remove us from active 
engagement with our experiences should be adapted to help us to reconnect with 
ourselves and the world around us. 
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